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I. INTRODUCTION
North Carolina's Attorney General, Mike Easley, defined
predatory lending as the use of "high-rate, high-fee loans tar-
geted to borrowers.. .with cash flow problems" which are more
likely to lead to foreclosures.' The volume of these loans has
soared in recent years, 2 resulting in economic and psychological
devastation 3 for many low-income,4 elderly,5 minority,6 and un-
1. Heather Timmons, North Carolina Attorney General, Communih Group Hit
Predaton Lending, AM. BANKER, Apr. 21,1999, at 13.
2. See 1999 HoME EQUITY LENDING DIRECTORY: A STATISTICAL GUIDE To B&C
AND SECOND MORTGAGE LENDING, FAULKNER and GRAY 1-2 (1999).
3. See Alex M. Johnson Jr., Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An Economic Ap-
proach: Based on the Paradigmatic Norms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. REv. 959, 966-67
(1993). Borrowers usually lose all equity in the event of a foreclosure because the
lender has no reason to bid any more for a house than the amount of the debt. See
id. at 968-71. In the five country region of Chicago, the number of foreclosures grew
from 2,074 in 1993 to 3,964 in 1998, an increase of 91%. See Bill Rumbler and Alex
Rodriquez, Mortgage Foreclosures Here Go Through The Roof, THE CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1999, at 28A. Suburban area, as opposed to rural area, accounted for the
biggest growth of foreclosures. See id. In 1993, subprime lenders accounted for
only 1% of all foreclosures but by 1998, subprime loans comprised 36% of all fore-
closures. See id. Individuals who lose their homes are likely to be psychologically
devastated as well. See Eldon Killian, Effect of Geriatric Transfers on Mortality Rates,
SOCIAL WORK, Jan. 1970, at 19, 25. This can be seen in a study about the effects of
involuntary relocation on elderly residents. See id. Of those who were displaced
from their homes, the mortality rate within the first year ranged from five to nine
times higher than those who were able to stay put. See id. Another study focused
on the effects of displacing tenants out of the Boston slums as part of an urban re-
newal project. See Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Reloca-
tion, URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, 359, 359-61 (James Q.
Wilson ed., 1966). Even though many of these tenants were relocated to housing
that improved living conditions, many of these tenants suffered from the psycho-
logical effects of losing their homes. See id.
4. See Interview with Philip A. Lehman, Assistant Attorney General of North
Carolina, Office of Consumer Protection, in Raleigh, N.C. (Oct. 8,1999) [hereinafter
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sophisticated homeowners.
7
Simply put, predatory lending is the use of one or more
unfair practices by lenders to gain an unfair advantage over bor-
rowers.8 For instance, some borrowers are issued high-interest,
high-fee loans in which the loan principal varies little over time.9
Lehman Interview]. See also, DEBORAH GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING PREDATORY
LENDING: MOVING TOWARDS A COMMON DEFINITION AND WORKABLE SOLUTIONS 16
(1999) (reporting the effect of predatory lending on low-income homeowners)
(available at Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University). Subprime
lenders often lend to be poor and elderly. See John Hechinger, Associates First Of-
fers Rate-Cut Plan to Low-Income Home-Equity Borrowers, WALL ST. J., May 10,
1999, at 2. The Federal Trade Commission and the United States Department of
Justice are in the process of investigating the industry. See id.
5. See Equity Predators: Stripping, Flipping, and Packing Their Way to Profits:
Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 105th Cong. 80-99 (1998)
(Statement of William J Brennan, Jr., Director, Home Defense Program, Atlanta Le-
gal Aid Society, Atlanta, Ga.) [hereinafter Brennan Statement]. At the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) press conference on July 29, 1999, FTC Chairman Robert
Pitofsky stated that the elderly are the most vulnerable target for predatory lenders.
See Seven Home Equity Lenders to Pay $500,000 to settle FTC Allegations, 73 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 247 (Aug. 9,1999). At the same press conference, Ann Harvey, Director
of Program Development Services for the American Association of Retired People,
stated that the elderly "are popular targets of fraudulent home repair financing
schemes" because they have significant equity and also are more likely to need
home repairs. Id. Predatory lenders target older homeowners because they have
significant equity in their homes and substantial needs for money. See GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 16.
6. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 20. Minorities are being targeted for high
rate loans by finance companies. See Timmons, supra note 1.
7. See Lehman Interview, supra note 4. A lack of sophistication can be defined
as not having enough information to make a prudent decision. See Robin Morris,
Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usury, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 151, 170-73
(1988). This can be caused by misrepresentation by the broker or quickly going
through the paperwork without reviewing the loan terms with the borrower. See id.
8. See Interview with Ellen Schloemer, Communications Director, Self-Help
Credit Union, in Durham, N.C. (Oct. 19,1999) [hereinafter Schloemer Interview].
9. See Prime Time Live: Debt Reckoning (ABC television broadcast, April 23,
1997). One reported case showed that an independent broker suggested a $50,000
home equity loan to an elderly African-American couple to pay off some debt. See
id. The husband was disabled and the wife worked part time. See id. The terms of
the loan included an interest rate of 15%, finance fees of 5%, and credit life insur-
ance that they did not request or know about. See id. This practice of charging for a
service or product that is not requested by the borrower is known as packing. See
id. Despite making payments totaling $128,000 over 15 years, there was a $47,000
lump-sum payment (balloon) due at the end of the 15th year, for which they had no
ability to pay. See id. The elderly couple then faced the possibility of foreclosure.
See id. Bill Brennan, a legal aide lawyer in Atlanta, reported that predatory lenders
such as The Associates Financial Services target low income neighborhoods and
locate houses that have high owner equities by looking up houses in the deed book
and figuring out the balance owed on these houses. See id. It was reported that The
Associates Financial Services, a subprime lending subsidiary of Ford Motor Com-
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Often existing loans are repeatedly refinanced in which addi-
tional fees are charged, siphoning off the owner's home equity.1°
Some lenders use a sense of trust to avoid disclosing the terms of
a loan or rush through the borrower's review of voluminous loan
paperwork, leaving little time to ask questions." Also, some fi-
nancially unsophisticated borrowers with poor credit history but
high equity are targeted for loans, knowing that the loan cannot
be repaid.' 2
Predatory lending is seen in both consumer and home
lending transactions and is practiced in both the conventional
and the subprime lending markets; 13 however, a more substantial
pany, forecloses on about two percent of its loans, the same as the national average.
See id. However, homeowners who's debt exceeds their equity are encouraged to
sign over their deeds to The Associates, thereby avoiding the appearance of another
foreclosure on its records. See id. Ford's consumer finance operations held 350,000
mortgage loans, with a profit of $857 million in 1996, making it one of the largest
mortgage lenders in the country. See id.
10. See CBS Evening News: Eye on America (CBS television broadcast, March 16,
1998). An elderly white man, who wanted to purchase meat on credit, ended up
mortgaging his whole house for $50,000 with an interest rate of 19%. See id. Within
four years, the Associates flipped his loan 11 times, each time with a 10% finance
fee. See id. Eventually, half of his loan was comprised of finance fees. See id. An-
other case featured an illiterate elderly African-American man who needed money
to pay his taxes. See id. His lender issued a $26,000 home equity loan and refi-
nanced this loan twice within a 15-month period with interest up to 16.9%, along
with finance fees and a credit life insurance premium that represented 35% of his
loan. See id.
11. See Fox 5 News Investigation: Borrowing Trouble (WAGA-TV television
broadcast, May 4, 1998). A partially disabled white man suffering from diabetes
got a home equity loan of $36,000 at a rate of 16.5%. See id. In just four months, his
loan was refinanced in which a $5,000 credit life insurance premium was tacked on,
reflecting $75,000 worth of insurance coverage, despite the fact that his loan was
for only $43,000. See id. He did not recall having purchased this insurance nor did
he have any family members to justify such a purchase. See id. Federal laws focus
primarily on the disclosure of loan information, but the disclosure laws have a
questionable effect because of the volume of paper that must be completed at the
time of the loan closing. See Telephone Interview with Paul Stock, Executive Vice
President & Counsel, N.C. Bankers' Association, Raleigh, N.C. Uan. 3, 2000) [here-
inafter Stock Telephone Interview].
12. See Your Money (CNN television broadcast, May 23,1998). A middle-aged
single white woman had $150,000 worth of equity in her home and a debt of
$70,000 for which she needed a loan. See id. Despite having knowledge of her poor
credit history and a limited income, a subprime lender persistently called her at
nights and on weekends to convince her to get a home equity loan against the value
of her home. See id. Within a year she was sold five different loans by the same
lender and was in danger of losing her home because of her inability to make the
monthly payments. See id.
13. See Schloemer Interview, supra note 8. Self-Help Credit Union is a non-
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portion of the subprime lending market engages in this practice? 4
The subprime market provides loans to many individuals who
were rejected by lenders in the conventional market as a result of
poor credit history 15 or because of excessive debt obligations.
16
Surprisingly, some people qualify for conventional loans but are
not placed in these loans by brokers who stand to make a greater
profit from issuing a subprime loan.17
profit lender to small business and individual depositors, serving clients through-
out North Carolina. See id.
14. See Amal Sabi, Tiff Surrounds Big Bank's Subprime Efforts, TRIANGLE Bus.
J., May 28,1999 at 9. Martin Eakes, President of the Self-Help Credit Union in Dur-
ham and leader of the Coalition for Responsible Lending, estimated that 25% of all
subprime loans are made in a predatory manner. See id. The Community Rein-
vestment Association of North Carolina estimates that predatory lending comprises
50% of the subprime market, using a definition of predatory as any abusive practice
listed in William Brennan's testimony before the United States Senate Special
Committee on Aging Hearing on March 16, 1998. See Telephone Interview with
Jeanette Bradley, Program Director, Community Reinvestment Association of
North Carolina, in Raleigh, N.C. (Nov. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Bradley Telephone In-
terview]. This list includes 32 definitions of predatory lending practices, divided
into three loan categories; origination, servicing, and collection. See Brennan State-
ment, supra note 5.
15. See R. Carter Pate, et. al., Subprime Auto Finance: The Year of the Bankruptcies,
AM. BANKER. INST. J., May 1998, available in LEXIS, Bkrtcy Library, ABIJ File. See
generally Evan M. Gilreath, Note, 77e Entrance of Banks into Subprinme Lending: First
Union and The Money Store, 3 N.C. BANKING INT. 149, 150 (1999) (providing over-
view of the banking industry's entry into the subprime lending market).
16. See Carol Frey, Subprime Time for Borrowers Isn't Now as Credit Tightens,
NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh), October 30, 1998, at 1D (citing Jeffrey Zeltzer, Execu-
tive Director of the National Home Equity Mortgage Association). Most home
loans are secured on the conventional market where lenders compete for the least
risky borrowers in return for the most favorable interest rates that generally range
from 2 to 3 percentage points above the rate on comparable-maturity Treasury
bonds. See Schloemer Interview, supra note 8. Treasury bills are government secu-
rities used to finance the government debt, backed by the full faith and credit of the
federal government. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, 1507 (7th ed. 1999). Treasury
bond rates vary depending on the maturity length of a given bond. See Money Rates,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1999, at C17. For example, the interest rate on a 30-year bond
effective November 1, 1999 was 6.0%, compared to the rate on a 1-year bond of
5.50%. See id. Depository institutions borrow their money from the Federal Re-
serve by paying the discount rate, 4.75% on November 1, 1999. See id. The lowest
market lending rates are those provided to the best corporate customers by 70% of
the nation's largest 30 banks. See id. Effective November 1, that rate was 8.25%. See
id.
17. See Interview with Susan Lupton, Project Director, Coalition for Responsi-
ble Lending, in Durham, N.C. (Nov. 8,1999) [hereinafter Lupton Interview].
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Predatory lenders use aggressive and deceptive marketing
techniques to earn the trust of consumers who often lack an on-
going relationship with a depository institution.18 In addition,
subprime borrowers are less likely to be well-informed than con-
ventional borrowers.19 Even well-informed subprime borrowers
may take on too much debt if they cannot imagine any risk based
on past experience, such as a foreclosure. 20 Moreover, borrowers
tend to perceive a financial disaster as probable only if it occurs
frequently or if it is highly publicized.21 This underestimation
also renders many borrowers vulnerable to predatory tech-
niques.22
For those borrowers with an undesirable credit history,
the subprime lending market provides an opportunity to obtain
credit,23 albeit for higher interest rates and finance fees.24 Sub-
18. See id. Elderly consumers are more likely to be vulnerable to the aggres-
sive marketing tactics because many of them are at home during the day when
door-to-door salesman and telemarketers are more likely to call. See Monroe
Friedman, Confidence Swindles of Older Consumers, 26 J. OF CONSUMER AFF. 20 (1992).
19. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 29. A 1997 survey by the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) indicated 29% of subprime borrowers did
not search for the best interest rate, while only 13% of prime borrowers failed to
conduct such a search. See id. FHLMC was established as a governmental agency
to purchase loans from lenders and insure them against the risk of borrower de-
fault. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging The American Dream: A Critical
Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TuLANE
L. REv. 373,384 (1994).
22. See id. at 387-392.
23. See Frey, supra note 16. It is estimated that 25% of Americans have unde-
sirable credit history. See id. Borrowers are categorized into tiers of risk from "A"
to "D." See Schloemer Interview, supra note 8. The conventional market serves
primarily the top tier of these categories, known as "A" borrowers. See id. Conven-
tional loans are less costly to borrowers than subprime loans. See Sabi, supra note
14. "A" borrowers as defined by FHLMC as those that have a good credit history;
no late mortgage payments; only minimal or credit card late payments; and a debt
ratio maximum of 38%, with no more than 38% of income used to pay off total debt.
See Telephone Interview with Stella Adams, Executive Director, North Carolina
Housing Center, Durham, N.C. (Oct. 13,1999). Although it is estimated that at least
one-third of "A-" subprime borrowers would qualify for "A" quality conventional
loans, many of them are steered towards subprime loans instead. See id. These "A-"
borrowers are defined as having a history of only one to two mortgage payments 30
days late; no more than one 60 day late payment on revolving or installment credit;
and a debt-to-income ratio of 40%. See id. The worst rated "D" borrower has fre-
quent late mortgage payments, but never more than 120 days late; a debt ratio of
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prime lenders charge more for their loans than conventional
lenders do because of the increased risk of borrower default and
because these borrowers usually have no alternative lending
sources.25 Also, subprime lenders have additional expenses be-
cause they must closely monitor their loans to ensure receipt of
monthly payments.26
Unlike subprime lenders, many conventional lenders have
customer deposits as a ready-made and cheap source for loan
funding.27 Conventional lenders make money from the spread
between the low interest they pay their depositors and the inter-
est they receive from conventional borrowers.28 Subprime lend-
ers typically have no such deposits.29 Instead, they must borrow
money at a higher rate from other financial institutions or in the
capital markets.30 To avoid having continually to borrow capital
to fund more consumer loans, many subprime lenders sell off ex-
isting loans to investors.31 The proceeds from these sales provide
a revolving pool of funds to make more loans.32 For those who
sell off loans, the chief income source is derived from finance
fees.33 Whether they sell off loans or fund them, subprime lend-
60%; and discharged bankruptcy status. See id.
24. See Christina Brinkley, Mortgaged Lenders Pursue Once-Shunned Borrowers,
WALL ST. J. (Florida Journal), Sep. 11, 1996, at F1, available in 1996 WL-WSJ 1179858.
25. See Scott Leath and Jim Weiker, High-Risk Lender, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
Dec. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 24032312. As opposed to an interest rate of 7% or
8% for a conventional loan, the subprime lending rate ranges from 13% to 15% for
home equity loans. See Jessica Skelly, Risky Business, RETAIL BANKER INT'L, Mar. 31,
1998, available in 1998 WL 10785388. It is not unusual to see origination fees that
range from 5% to 10%. See Brinkley supra note 24.
26. See Dona DeZube, The Stress of Subprime Servicing, MORTGAGE BANKING,
Oct. 1998, at 103. This labor intensive monitoring is about four times more expen-
sive than what is required to service a conventional loan. See id.
27. See Paul Muolo, Subprime Meltdown: A Time to Buy?, U.S. BANKER, Dec.
1998, at 78, 82.
28. See Skelly, supra note 25.
29. See id.
30. See id. Banks borrow from their depositors at a low interest rate, reflecting
a lack of risk. That is, if the bank cannot repay the loan, the FDIC will repay the
loan. See JONATHAN MACEY AND GEOFFREY MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION
22-23 (2nd ed. 1997).
31. See Greg Ip, Credit Crunches Aren't /hat They Used to Be, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7,
1998, at A18.
32. See Skelly, supra note 25.
33. See STEvEN L. ScHWARcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (1990) (discussing the process of securitization).
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ers have a "win-win situation."34 If their loan is brokered to an-
other institution, the higher finance fees are an immediate and
sizeable profit.35 If the loan is retained, the lender receives a con-
siderable return from the higher interest rate.36 f the borrower
defaults, the lender can foreclose on the house to recover the out-
standing loan.3
7
The impetus for statutory action came not only from the
tactics employed by lenders who use predatory practices, but
also from the rapidly increasing volume of loans that had preda-
tory characteristics. 38 In 1994, the total outstanding loans in the
U.S. residential market stood at $768 billion.39 Subprime lending
constituted only $25 billion or 3% of that market.40 By 1998, the
outstanding loans in the U.S. residential market totaled approxi-
mately $1.2 trillion, and subprime loans had risen to about $160
billion or 13% of that market.4'
Aside from the excessively high rates and fees, some of the
many tactics employed by predatory lenders include: (1) using
prepayment penalties to discourage borrowers from paying off
loans, thus preventing refinancing or selling the home; (2) using
balloon payments in which monthly payment amounts are so
small that there is little or no reduction of the loan principal at
the end of the loan period; (3) using negative amortization in
which the scheduled monthly payments are so low that they fail
34. United Companies Lending Corp. v. McGehee, 686 So. 2d 1171,1177 (Ala.




38. See Lew Sichelman, Battle Now Moves To States, ORIGINATION NEws, Aug. 1,
1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 11126452.
39. See 1999 HOME EQurrY LENDING DIRECrORY, supra note 2.
40. See id.
41. See id. Assuming that predatory loans comprise 25% of the subprime mar-
ket, these loans grew from over $6 billion to roughly $40 billion. See Sabi, supra
note 14. This increase in loan activity exceeded 500% in just a four-year period. See
1999 HoME EQUITy LENDING DmcroRY, supra note 2. To entice more borrowers,
predatory lenders contact current mortgagors of their own, purchase borrower lists
from other financial companies or advertise on the open market. See Lehman Inter-
view, supra note 4. Potential customers are solicited by means of telemarketing,
direct mail, home visits and television ads promising to consolidate bills, lower
monthly payments or generate extra cash to pay off other debts. See id.
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to pay off the accrued interest and thereby increase the amount of
the principal; (4) financing credit life insurance premiums
wherein all future premiums are lumped together and assessed
in present dollars; and (5) repeated refinancing into larger loans
with no benefit to the borrower, known as flipping.42 With each
flip, origination and closing costs become part of the amount fi-
nanced, thereby increasing the debt and decreasing the owner's
equity.43
This article will explain the practice of predatory lending,44
its consequences, 45 and the extent to which the new predatory
lending statute (hereinafter North Carolina Act) addresses the
problems of predatory lending.46
II. RELEVANT FEDERAL STATUTES
For over thirty years, federal statutes were layered upon
each other to cover gaps that allowed unfair lending practices to
occur.47 Because of this lack of statutory controls, litigation dur-
42. See Brennan Statement, supra note 5. The Community Reinvestment Asso-
ciation of North Carolina (CRANC) has adopted Brennan's list of predatory lending
tactics and has added some of its own. See Bradley Telephone Interview, supra note
14.
43. See Bradley Telephone Interview, supra note 14.
44. See infra notes 9-161 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 162-264 and accompanying text.
47. See Paul Mondor, Mortgage Reform: Staying Alive, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct.
1, 1998 at 145, 147. The first such statute was Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act,
enacted "to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout
the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994). Despite this intention, these federal
housing statutes made it increasingly difficult to regulate abusive lending practices
because of their preemption of state regulatory authority. See infra notes 47-105 and
accompanying text. This usurping of state controls has created a dangerous void in
consumer protection. See id. Federal tax statutes have also encouraged the use of
home equity loans as the preferred source of consumer credit for virtually all
homeowners, even for those who cannot afford to repay loans. See Forrester, supra
note 21, at 409. Such statutes run counter to the well-founded policy of home own-
ership in the United States by increasing the likelihood of foreclosure. See id. The
federal government has supported the idea of home ownership, at least since 1934,
when Congress established the Federal Housing Authority to furnish federal insur-
ance for home mortgage lenders to protect against home mortgage default. See id.
at 395. This was soon followed by the creation of the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA) in 1938 to channel funds into the home mortgage market by
ISSUES IN LENDING
ing this time showed an emerging trend of some courts across the
country to assess penalties against predatory lenders, 4 based on
established principles of law, such as fraud, and on policy
grounds.49
Relevant federal housing statutes can be categorized as
those that address the disclosure of loan information and restrict
abusive practices;50 those that promote home equity loans as a
preferred method of extending consumer credit;51 and those that
prevent discriminatory practices.
5 2
purchasing FHA insured loans. See id. at 396. The federal policy of supporting
home ownership is reflected in the preference of most Americans to own homes
because of the stability associated with it, better social and financial status and the
potential for asset appreciation. See id. at 406. These advantages are perceived to
outweigh the disadvantages such as decreased mobility and the potential for loss in
the event that property values drop. See id. at 407. Proponents argue that the socie-
tal benefits of home ownership are superior maintenance of housing and a more
responsible citizenry. See id. Opponents argue that the societal costs include tax
breaks and a more expensive infrastructure of roads and utilities. See id. at 408.
These tax breaks are a disadvantage to those consumers without homes since they
cannot deduct consumer or home mortgage interest. See id. at 409. Further, the
deduction feature of home equity loans is really a subsidy targeted at middle class
and wealthy taxpayers that stand the best chance of repaying the loan. See id. at
408.
48. See Seven Home Equity Lenders to Pay $500,000 to settle FTC Allegation, supra
note 5. The FTC announced on July 29, 1999 that it had charged seven subprime
lenders with violating the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act of 1994 as a re-
sult of alleged abusive lending practices. See id. See also Glenn Kalinoski, Lender
Groups Oppose Unconscionable Fees, NATIONAL MORTGAGE NEWS, June 7,1999 (citing
a court holding that prohibited a lender from charging points above 5%). See also
Heather Timmons, Lender Appeases Activists with $100 Million Pledge, AM. BANKER,
May 11, 1999, at 30 (reporting a pledge by Associates First Capital Corporation to
provide $100 million in low-rate loans in response to predatory lawsuit threats).
49. See infra notes 122-161 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
51. See infra note 78-105.
52. See 42 U.S.C. §3601 (1994). Between 1968 and 1977, a patchwork of federal
statutes was enacted to prevent discriminatory home lending practices such as red-
lining; the systematic act of refusing loans to protected classes and low income
neighborhoods. See id. To prevent discriminatory practices with respect to hous-
ing, Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act was enacted. See id. In addition, the Fair
Housing Act Amendments of 1988 became effective on March 13,1989. See id. at §§
3601-3631. This statute outlaws housing discrimination based on race, color, relig-
ion, sex or national origin. See id. at § 3604(a),(b). It also forbids discriminatory
residential real estate transactions and brokerage services. See id. at § 3605(b). The
prevention of discriminatory credit and lending practices on the basis of age and
marital status was addressed in 1974 when Congress passed the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act (ECOA). See 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994). Currently, ECOA prohibits a
creditor from discriminating against an applicant because of race, color, sex, na-
tional origin, marital status, age and religion when awarding credit. See id. at §
2000] 577
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A. Disclosures and Restrictions
Federal legislation aimed at disclosure and restrictions
started with the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).53 Enacted in 1968,
TILA requires disclosure about the costs and terms of consumer
credit transactions 4 This applies to elements of loans such as the
annual percentage rate, loan fees, service fees and premiums for
insurance. 55 TILA includes a right of rescission that allows con-
sumers three days to cancel a loan contract.5 6 It also gives the
borrower up to three years to cancel the loan if certain loan in-
formation, disclosed to the borrower by the lender, is inaccurate
or omitted.5 7 The purpose of this feature is to help ensure that
borrowers are well informed about their use of credit.5 8 In some
cases, this right has had narrow yet excessive effects.5 9 That is,
minor infractions of material disclosure were grounds to rescind
1619(a)(1). ECOA was a response to a practice of creditors, known as reverse red-
lining, in which legally protected individuals are targeted for high-cost loans. See
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 24. The effectiveness of ECOA has not been established
though. See Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, "Redlining," and the Discriminatory Access to
Loans, Credit, and Insurance: An Historical and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who
Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 1950-1995, 33 SAN DEGo L. REv.
583, 585-586, (1996). Federally insured financial lending institutions continue to
target certain neighborhoods. See id. at 584-585. To address this problem with the
ECOA, Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA). See 12
U.S.C. § 2901 (1994). However, there is significant public concern about the effec-
tiveness of CRA as well. See Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, "Redlining," and the Dis-
criminatory Access to Loans, Credit, and Insurance: An Historical and Empirical Analysis
of Consumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 1950-1995, 33
SAN DIEGO L. RE.. 583, 586 (1996). Consumer activists point out that some banks
and thrifts still redline, which undermines the stability of urban and rural
neighborhoods. See id. In addition, CRA offers no private right of action. See
Harambee Uhuru School, Inc. v. Kemp, No. C2-90-949, 1992 WL 274545, at *4 (S.D.
Ohio Sept. 30,1992).
53. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994).
54. This included the disclosure of both open-end credit and closed-end credit
transactions. See id. at § 1602(e),(i).
55. See id. at §§ 1605(a), 1631.
56. See id. at § 1635(a).
57. See id. at § 1635(f). The lender must disclose to the borrower the finance
charge and the annual percentage rate. See id.
58. See id. at § 1601.
59. See Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994). If the
lender failed to disclose even minor charges, such as the fee for a courier delivery,
there were grounds for invoking a right of rescission on the part of the consumer,
under TILA. See id. at 1148-1149.
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the complete loan transaction.60
TILA was amended in 1994 to include the Home Owner-
ship and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), another step towards
eliminating predatory lending practices.61 HOEPA targets a spe-
cial category of regulated, closed-end loans that use above mar-
ket interest rates and excessive fees.62 Within this category,
HOEPA requires additional disclosures,63 extends potential liabil-
ity, creates new penalties,64 and restricts or prohibits certain abu-
sive loan terms used in high-cost home equity loans.65 To trigger
HOEPA restrictions and prohibitions, the annual percentage rate
of a loan must be 10% higher than a Treasury bond of compara-
ble maturity,66 or the finance points and fees exceed the greater of
60. See id. Following Rodash, there was a rash of litigation focused on taking
advantage of minor infractions of lenders as a reason to nullify the complete loan.
See Mondor, supra note 47, at 145.
61. See Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. § 1601
(1994) (amending the Truth in Lending Act). Numerous HOEPA restrictions do not
apply to reverse mortgages, first time home financing, or open-ended transactions
in which the terms of the loan may vary during the life of the loan. See id. at §
1602(aa)(1). See also Schloemer Interview, supra note 8. An example of an open-
ended transaction is a home equity line of credit. See Forrester, supra note 21, at
445.
62. See Gary Klein, The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994: En-
hanced TILA Protections, 1114 PLI/ CORP 345,345 (1999).
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b)(2) (1994). HOEPA requires lenders to disclose the
terms of the loan anytime they change those terms. See id. Lenders must also make
specific disclosures when issuing mortgage loans. See id. at § 1639(a). This includes
a written statement that informs prospective borrowers that signing an application
does not require that they go through with the loan and also that if the loan obliga-
tions are not met, they could lose the home. See id. In addition, if the loan has a
fixed interest rate, the annual percentage rate and the regular monthly payment
must be disclosed. See id. If the loan does not have a fixed rate, in addition to the
annual percentage rate and the monthly payments, the lender must instruct the
borrower that the monthly payments may increase to a given maximum rate. See
id. Finally, HOEPA provides, but does not require, the use of a model disclosure
form to facilitate compliance with the disclosure requirement. See id. at § 1604(b).
64. See id. at § 1640(a). HOEPA permits both individual and class actions. See
id. A violation of any provision of this Act brings civil liability for actual damages,
statutory damages, and attorney fees and costs. See id.
65. See id. at § 1639. Balloon payments with terms of less than five years, cer-
tain prepayment penalties, negatively amortized loans, extension of credit without
regard to the borrower's ability to repay the loan, and advance payments of more
than two payments are among the prohibited practices under HOEPA. See id.
66. See id. at § 1602(aa)(1)(A). The interest rate trigger of 10% is criticized for
being too high for permitting abusive lenders to use the ceiling to establish their
rates, just under the HOEPA limit. See GOLDsTEIN, supra note 4, at 27. Treasury bill
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8% of the loan or $400.67 For example, if the term of a loan is 10
years and the 10-year Treasury bond rate was 5.7%, then HOEPA
coverage is be triggered only by transactions in which the annual
percentage rate of the loan is greater than 15.7%.68
Disclosure requirements on real estate transactions were
established in the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974
(RESPA).69 Specifically, a "good faith estimate"70 of settlement
charges must be shown on a uniform settlement statement form
in which all charges in the real estate transaction must be item-
ized and details of the loan servicing process must be disclosed.7
In addition, RESPA restricts the assessment of fees for services
not rendered.72
To allow a means for disclosing and tracking lending data
across the country, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
(HMDA) was enacted.73 It requires all federally regulated de-
pository institutions such as banks, savings and loans, and credit
unions to furnish yearly data on loan applications if they meet
certain requirements for asset size and number of loans made
within the metropolitan area in which they extend loans.74 Non-
depository institutions have requirements that are less strict.75
Also, the reporting institutions must compile data about race,
gender, income, and the ultimate status of each loan applica-
tion.76 Also, HMDA does not require the collection of data about
interest rates or other loan terms, thus eliminating the possibility
rates of return vary based on the length of the bond period. See Money Rates, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 1, 1999, at C17. For example, a 13-week bill pays a yield of 4.995% and
six-month bill pays a yield of 5.115%. See id. The HOEPA fee threshold trigger is
8%. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) (1994).
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1)(B) (1994).
68. See id. The restrictions of HOEPA are considerable, but they are not trig-
gered unless a home equity loan has particularly high rates or fees. See Forrester,
supra note 21, at 445.
69. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994).
70. Id. at § 2604(c).
71. See id. at § 2603.
72. See id. at § 2607(c).
73. See Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975,12 U.S.C. § 2801 (1976).
74. See id. at §§ 2801, 2803(a). Depository institutions that must adhere to
these regulations were defined by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. See id. at § 2802(2).
75. See Bradley Telephone Interview, supra note 14.
76. See id.
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of conducting any predatory lending analysis 7
B. Promotion
Federal law has encouraged the use of home equity
loans78 by allowing a tax deduction for home mortgage inter-
est.79 For some thirty years following the enactment of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954,80 federal tax law treated most
interest paid by individuals as deductible. 81 However, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 limited the deductibility of consumer in-
terest to home, education and medical expenses.82 In 1987, this
limitation was dropped in favor of a $100,000 cap on home eq-
uity indebtedness, 3 thus permitting home equity loan pro-
ceeds to be used for any reason.84  Although using the
77. See id. The reporting of racial data is sparse, so meaningful conclusions
cannot be made about redlining practices. See id. According to a study conducted
by the Community Reinvestment Association of North Carolina in 1996, only a
third of the loans recorded in North Carolina deeds of trust, made by mortgage and
finance companies, were reported in the HMDA loan data. See id.
78. See Forrester, supra note 21, at 393.
79. See 132 CoNG. REc. 13,595 (1986) (statement of Sen. Graham); 132 CONG.
REG. 13,601 (statement of Sen. Gorton).
80. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See Forrester, supra
note 21, at 410.
81. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 163 (1956) (repealed 1986).
There were some exceptions in the 1954 Code to the general deductibility of inter-
est. See id. at §§ 264-267. See also, Forrester, supra note 21, at 410-411 (explaining
features of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954). However, in 1984, this deduction
came under scrutiny when former President Reagan asked for a tax reform package
that would bring "fairness, simplicity and incentives for growth." Id. at 411. As
part of this package, the President originally considered eliminating all interest
deductions, but later decided to limit only the deductibility of consumer interest.
See id.
82. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(b)(4), 100 Stat. 2085,
2247-49 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (1988)). This reform allowed an
interest deduction for both a "taxpayer's principle residence and one other resi-
dence... up to the amount of the taxpayer's basis in the residence...." Forrester,
supra note 21, at 412-13 n.209. The reform also permitted a deduction on the interest
arising from certain medical and educational debt, but the total home, medical and
educational debt could not exceed the fair market value of the residence. See id. at
412-13.
83. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) (1994).
84. See Forrester, supra note 21, at 413-415. The elimination of the consumer
interest deduction and the flexibility to use home equity loan proceeds, for any rea-
son, encouraged consumers to use the home equity loan as a way of getting funds
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deduction makes economic sense for some consumers, it can
be a pitfall for unsophisticated borrowers because their homes
are placed at risk.85
The increased volume of home loans was accompanied by
the preemption of state interest rate control in the Depository In-
stitution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DID-
MCA).86 DIDMCA was created to preempt state control of
interest rates for home loans provided by first liens.87 Each state
had three years to opt out of this deregulatory measure.88 North
Carolina opted out, thus retaining control over its usury laws.
8 9
Two years later, the arsenal of home loan products was
expanded under the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act
of 1982 (AMTPA).90 AMTPA was created to allow borrowers ac-
cess to a broad range of lending products. 91 It also was created to
provide a level playing field for all types of lenders, so that a
state could not discriminate against any one type of lender in
light of the high inflationary environment.92 AMTPA allows al-
ternative mortgage financing arrangements such as balloon pay-
ments, negative amortizing loans and adjustable rate
mortgages.93 Another feature of AMTPA is that both first and
that would have otherwise been unsecured or secured by some other form of collat-
eral. See id.
85. See id. at 414-416. Senator Bumpers said: "[We will be encouraging home-
owners to take second and third mortgages on their homes, which I question as a
public policy. I predict that we'll soon see checking accounts and credit card ac-
counts based on home mortgages." 132 CONG. REc. 13,602 (1986) (statement of Sen.
Bumpers).
86. See Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221,94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in various sections of 12
U.S.C.).
87. See Forrester, supra note 21, at 399 n.137. DIDMCA did away with interest
rate limits on savings and loan deposits and also gave the flexibility to savings and
loans to make non-mortgage investments. See id.
88. See Lehman Interview, supra note 4. See also Forrester, supra note 21, at
399-400 (explaining that sixteen states opted out of this usury preemption).
89. See Lehman Interview, supra note 4. Usury is "the charging of an illegal
rate of interest" or "an illegally high rate of interest." BLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY,
1543 (7th ed. 1999).
90. Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 3803
(1994).
91. See id. at § 3801(a),(b).
92. See id.
93. See Forrester, supra note 21, at 419. A balloon payment is defined as a
large principal remaining at the end of the loan, usually equal to 85% of the original
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second home liens are preempted from state control of finance
arrangements. 94 States were allowed to opt out of AMTPA's pre-
emptory coverage,95 but North Carolina failed to do so. 96 As a
result, out-of-state brokers claimed a federal preemption to use
prepayment penalties as part of an adjustable rate mortgage, in
spite of a state law that forbids the use of such penalties. 97
The tax deductibility of home equity loans, the absence
of interest rate regulation under DIDMCA, and the deregula-
tion of alternative mortgage financing under AMTPA resulted
in an unprecedented economic opportunity for many consum-
ers, who could not otherwise get loans.98 This fueled a signifi-
cant increase in predatory lending practices.99 In response,
various legislative initiatives ensued, aimed at creating a more
comprehensive reform of federal statutes. 00 One of the initia-
tives, the Mortgage Reform Working Group (MRWG), was
comprised of representatives from twenty industry groups
and five consumer groups around the country.' 01 The MRWG
determined that there were six essential issues that needed to
be included in the reform of RESPA and TILA; disclosure, pro-
tection from abuse, foreclosure relief, referral fees, penalties
and remedies, and state law preemption.102
loan principal, as a result of structuring low monthly payments not designed to
sufficiently pay down the principal. See GOLDSrEIN, supra note 4, at 13. Negative
amortization is defined as the structuring of a loan in a way that the monthly pay-
ments do not pay off all the accrued interest, thereby increasing the principal. See
id. Adjustable rate mortgages are defined in AMTPA as a consumer loan that is
secured by a lien on a one to four family dwelling unit in which the creditor may
change the interest rate. See 12 U.S.C. § 3806(a)(2) (1994). A mere rate change fol-
lowing the default of a loan constitutes an adjustable rate mortgage. See Interview
with Eric Stein, Vice President, Self-Help Credit Union, in Durham, N.C. (Oct. 19,
1999) [hereinafter Stein Interview].
94. See Forrester, supra note 21, at 419.
95. See Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C.A. §
3804(a) (1982).
96. See Lehman Interview, supra note 4. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2.3 (1995)
(documenting North Carolina's failure to opt out of the AMTPA preemption).
97. See Lehman Interview, supra note 4.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See Mondor, supra note 47, at 146. Comprehensive reform was favored to
address the inadequacy of federal regulations. See id. at 147.
101. See id. at 146.
102. See id. at 146-147. The MRWG was initiated by United States Representa-
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Despite the work of MRWG and the attempts of consumer
advocacy groups to persuade the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) to prohibit predatory practices, no
progress was made.10 3 Because of the unsuccessful efforts to gar-
ner support in Washington for the enactment of a federal statute
to comprehensively address the predatory lending issue, con-
sumer groups moved their battles to state legislatures, with
North Carolina and New York being the first ones to take up the
issue.
Due to the frustration experienced by victims and their
concerned communities, consumer advocacy groups in North
Carolina grew into an exceptionally organized and influential
political force.1°4 This force was bolstered by the work of the
North Carolina Department of Justice, which investigated a
growing number of consumer complaints about abusive lending
practices.u05
HI. RELEVANT NORTH CAROLINA STATUTES
North Carolina's state statutes have also been inadequate
for stopping predatory lending because they are not designed to
address the recent generation of deceptive practices aimed at side
tives Rick Lazio. See id. HUD and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System submitted a joint report to Congress in July, 1988 that recommended statu-
tory changes not limited merely to disclosure. See id. The recommendations were
criticized by some as not being strict enough. See id. at 150. "It fails to do away
with the myth that consumers shop for and select the providers of required loan
related services." Id. For example, there was no provision to simplify loan informa-
tion so borrowers could make comparisons when they shop for loans. See id.
103. See Sichelman, supra note 38. These predatory practices included equity-
stripping, flipping, and packing. See id. "[M]ortgage business.. .leaders have been
able to convince HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo that only a small minority of lend-
ers are guilty of unscrupulous tactics." Id.
104. See Bill Merrick, NFCDCU Lauded for Transforming Lives, CREDT UNION
MAGAZINE, Aug. 1, 1999 at 77.
105. See Poonkulali Thangavelu, North Carolina Has First Law to Police Predatory
Lending, ORIGINATION NEws, Aug. 1, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 11126452. At-
torney General Mike Easley indicated that his office received over 50 complaints
against Associates First Capital for allegedly taking part in predatory lending and
he stated that "we are prepared to take whatever action is necessary to stop preda-
tory lending." Id. Mr. Easley also indicated in April of 1999 that he was investigat-
ing five predatory lenders operating in North Carolina. See Timmons, supra note 1.
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stepping the law. 106 Many out-of-state lenders have found a prof-
itable niche as evidenced by the increasing number of predatory
loans issued to North Carolinians. As a result, there is a height-
ened awareness of the need for statutory change.107 Moreover,
the lack of a significant common law precedent in the area of
predatory lending causes difficulty in applying any restric-
tions.108
Most instances of usury in home loans are not likely to be
covered by the North Carolina state usury statute.109 A contract
is usurious only if the lender purposely and intentionally charges
and receives a greater rate of interest than that allowed by law.11°
However, there is no limit on finance charges or points and there
is no regulation of rates for first mortgages."'
The North Carolina unfair and deceptive practices statute
also has a limited effect on predatory lending, because it uses
106. See Telephone Interview with Philip A. Lehman, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of North Carolina, Office of Consumer Protection Uan. 31, 2000) [hereinafter
Lehman Telephone Interview of Jan. 31, 2000]. See also Stock Telephone Interview,
supra note 11 (indicating that state statutes have been ineffective at addressing the
rise in predatory lending).
107. See Stock Telephone Interview, supra note 11.
108. See id.
109. See Lehman Telephone Interview of Jan. 31, 2000, supra note 106 (referring
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1(1999)). The purpose of this statute was to protect borrow-
ers from oppressive lenders. See Moore v. Woodward, 83 N.C. 531 (1880). Since
1741, North Carolina had a usury statute that addressed charges taken or received
that were higher than the legal rate. See Susan Pannell McAllister, Note, Judicially
Imposed Usunj Penalties in the Absence of Statutonj Penalties: Can Freedom of Contract
Co-Exist with Public Policy After Merritt v. Knox?, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1021, 1025 n.47
(1990).
110. Polikoff v. Fin. Serv. Co., 205 N.C. 631,635,172 S.E. 356,358-59 (1934). The
penalty for usury is double damages. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1999); Britt v.
Jones, 123 N.C. App. 108, 110-13, 472 S.E.2d 199, 200-02 (1996). If a lender fraudu-
lently obtains money from a borrower, then there is "no meeting of the minds be-
tween the parties...," and this statute determines the legal rate of interest on the
obligation. Speros Constr. Co. v. Musselwhite, 103 N.C. App. 510, 512, 405 S.E. 2d
785, 786 (1991) (citing Normile v. Miller and Segal v. Miller 313 N.C. 98, 103, 326
S.E.2d. 11, 15 (1985)). If a lender intentionally charges or receives more than speci-
fied under a contract, the "entire interest" of the loan is forfeited. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
24-2 (1999).
111. See Lehman Telephone Interview of Jan. 31, 2000, supra note 106. Prepay-
ment penalty fees are permitted unless excluded by the loan agreement. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 24-2.4 (1999).
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language written in general terms." 2 For example, although
there is heightened concern over the many types of fees that ap-
pear in home loans, there are no specific regulations regarding
these fees." 3 This has led to a widespread practice of duplicative
charges or fees for illusory services." 4 The purpose of the statute
is to apply "ethical standards" in business transactions to "pro-
mote good faith,"" 5 and to protect "the consuming public./11
6
An act of unfairness is "judged by viewing it against the back-
ground of actual human experience and by determining its in-
tended and actual effects upon others."" 7 Because of this
abstract language and lack of case law relating to lending prac-
tices, the unfair trade practices statute has been inadequate to
address predatory lending problems."8
The North Carolina statute relating to the registration of
mortgage lenders and brokers governs the registration require-
ments for these professions." 9 However, there are no private
112. See Lehman Telephone Interview of Jan. 31, 2000, supra note 106 (referring
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1999)). At common law, agreements that prejudice "the
public by unduly or unreasonably restricting competition or restraining trade are
illegal." Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 656, 194 S.E.2d 521, 530-31
(1973).
113. See Lehman Telephone Interview of Jan. 31, 2000, supra note 106.
114. See id.
115. United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 485 F.Supp. 1041, 1046
(E.D.N.C. 1979).
116. Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162,167 (4th Cir. 1985). In
order to establish a prima fade claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendants
committed an unfair and deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce, and the
plaintiff was injured thereby. First Atl. Management Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co.,
131 N.C. App. 242, 252, 507 S.E.2d 56, 63 (1998) (citing Canady v. Mann, 107 N.C.
App. 252,260,419 S.E.2d 597,602 (1992)).
117. Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393,400,248 S.E.2d
739, 744 (1978). "The facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction" are
used to determine the validity of the allegation of unfairness or deceit. Peterson v.
Bozzano, 183 B.R. 735, 738 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995). There is no defense for making
misrepresentations based on ignorance, good faith, negligence, or lack of intent. See
Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc., 99 N.C. App.587, 601, 394 S.E.2d 643, 651 (1990). If a
defendant acted in a willful, oppressive, or reckless manner, punitive damages may
be recovered. See United Lab., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 335 N.C. 183,191,437 S.E.2d 374,
379 (1993). To recover attorney fees, based on an unfair practice, the plaintiff must
also prove that the defendant "refused to fully resolve the matter. ... " 335 N.C. at
190, 437 S.E.2d at 378.
118. See Lehman Telephone Interview of Jan. 31, 2000, supra note 106.
119. See Lehman Telephone Interview of Jan. 31, 2000, supra note 106 (referring
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remedies under this statute and the administrative enforcement
authority is limited to the Commissioner of Banks.120
The lack of statutory scope in addressing a variety of lend-
ing abuses, the lack of specificity of statutory language and the
lack of preventative controls and prohibitions has rendered the
existing North Carolina statutes inadequate in addressing the
practice of predatory lending.12'
IV. RECENT LrIGATION
Most instances of predatory lending are not litigated be-
cause it is easy for lenders to conform to federal law.122 As long
as lenders disclose the terms of a loan in writing, keep the loan
terms within HOEPA's generous limits, give the borrower a
three-day cooling-off period for an opportunity to rescind the
lending agreement, and do not discriminate based on gender,
age, race, color, national origin or religion, there are no grounds
to sue the lender.123 In addition, borrowers of predatory loans do
not usually have the resources to pay the costs of litigation. 24
The inadequacy of federal and local laws in limiting
predatory lending practices can be seen in cases such as DeBerry
v. First Government Mortgage and Investors Corp. 25 In DeBerry, the
borrower inherited a home that she refinanced six times in a four
year period; four times through the defendant and twice through
another lender. 2 6 The plaintiff alleged that in financing two of
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-235 (1999)).
120. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-239 (1999). The Commissioner may order a mort-
gage banker or broker to "cease and desist" from violating this statute. Id. How-
ever, if such party fails to make an appeal and continues to violate the statute, the
Commissioner may issue a fine of $1000 and/or revoke the registration. See id.
121. See Lehman Telephone Interview of Jan. 31, 2000, supra note 106.
122. See Stock Telephone Interview, supra note 11.
123. See id.
124. See Schloemer Interview, supra note 8.
125. 170 F.3d 1105 (D.C.Cir. 1999). The tension between public policy and the
freedom to contract was exposed in Merritt v. Knox, 94 N.C. App. 340, 380 S.E.2d
160 (1989) where the court penalized the lender and gave relief to the borrower
even though there were no statutory penalties available for the lender's charging of
excessively high interest rates, bargained for by the borrower. See McAllister, supra
note 109, at 1021-22.
126. See DeBerry, 170 F.3d at 1106.
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the remaining four loans, the defendant violated the Consumer
Protection Procedures Act of the District of Columbia (CPPA)12
7
by engaging in unlawful trade practices.128 The plaintiff alleged
that the finance fees in one of her loans added up to over 25% of
the total loan amount, and that the loans were unconscionable
and constituted predatory lending.129 The defendant conceded
that real estate mortgage transactions might have been covered
under a CPPA provision outlawing trade practices that misrepre-
sent material facts, but the defendant pointed out that the
CPPA's language prohibiting unconscionable trade practices ap-
plied only to the sale or lease of goods or serviceS,130 thus leading
to an ambiguous interpretation of the CPPA.13' In its holding, the
United States Court of Appeals certified to the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals the issue of whether the CPPA applied to
real estate mortgage transactions.132 The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals later held that the CPPA "applies to real estate
mortgage finance transactions" and that the exploitation of "the
consumer's inability to make payment in full or otherwise protect
her interests" constituted a violation of the unconscionability
provisions of the CPPA.133
Aside from instances of statutory inadequacy, there have
also been isolated instances in which courts have adopted tests
extracted from common law or general principles that appear to
be directed toward public policy considerations. 134 In United
Companies Lending Corp. v. Sargeant,135 the plaintiff alleged that
127. D.C. Code §§ 28-3901-3909 (1981).
128. See De Berry, 170 F.3d at 1106.
129. See id. at 1107.
130. See id. at 1109-11. This certification was based on newly resurrected local
case law and a City Council amendment to the CPPA. See id. In addition, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals was to determine if the attorney fees with re-
spect to discovery were recoverable, regardless of the outcome of the case. See
DeBerry, 170 F.3d at 1111.
131. See id. at 1108.
132. See id. at 1111.
133. DeBerry v. First Government Mortgage and Investors Corp., 743 A.2d 699,
713 (D.C. 1999).
134. See supra notes 122-133 and accompanying text; infra notes 135-161 and ac-
companying text.
135.20 F.Supp.2d 192 (D. Mass 1998).
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United issued her a loan of approximately $134,700 to be applied
to two previous mortgages, home improvements and a credit
card payoff.136 As part of that loan, she paid over $23,000 in clos-
ing costs and fees, which included over $13,000 as the broker
fee.' 37 The initial annual percentage rate charged was 13.56%. 138
As a result of the plaintiff falling behind in her loan payments,
United started foreclosure proceedings. 39 In response, the plain-
tiff counter claimed that the transaction was unfair or deceptive
under the Massachusetts statutory law regarding unfair and de-
ceptive trade practices14° United argued that even though the
state lending regulations were in force, they were void because
the state's definition of unfair and deceptive was inconsistent
with the three prong test of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC).141 Also, Massachusetts common law was used to deter-
mine whether the defendant's actions were unconscionable,
based on the elements of unfair surprise and oppression 42
The U. S. District Court in Massachusetts held that a state
unfair and deceptive practices regulation was enforceable, based
on trade practice.143 With this holding, the plaintiff was awarded
the United broker fee, because the points charged differed sig-
nificantly from state industry practice and the state disclosure
requirements were violated.144 No reason was given as to why
HOEPA was not discussed in the court's holding.145 Regarding
the common law question of unconscionability, even though the
attorney general did not pursue this issue further, the court
awarded the plaintiff attorney fees and also a six-month window
of opportunity to be discharged from the loan by paying off the
136. See id. at 196.
137. See id. at 197.
138. See id. at 196.
139. See id.,at 197.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 198.
142. See id. at 209.
143. See id. at 209.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 209-210.
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remaining balance. 46
The FTC had previously used its policy-based test earlier
in Federal Trade Comm. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Company.1 47 Sperry
& Hutchinson was a large trading stamp company alleged to
have violated the FTC Act pertaining to unfair methods of com-
petition by attempting to suppress the free and open exchange of
its coupons on the market. 48 This three-factor unfairness analy-
sis was used to detect if there had been a substantial injury
caused to the consumer, a violation of public policy, and an un-
ethical, oppressive or unscrupulous practice.
149
The Court of Appeals indicated that it was not necessary
to establish all three factors in order to prove there had been a
violation of the FTC regulations.150 However, as a result of FTC's
failure to articulate any rational connection between the facts and
the charges made, the Court of Appeals set aside FTC's
charges.' 5' This ruling was affirmed by the United States Su-
preme Court, which saw the FTC test as being too narrow.152 The
Supreme Court preferred general criteria for determining unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices,
in order to prevent violators from escaping liability after commit-
ting unfair trade practices. 5 3
Another example of a common law and policy-based
court decision is seen in United Companies Lending Corporation v.
McGehee.1 4 In McGehee, an out-of-state lender, not approved by
the National Housing Act (NHA), fraudulently told a borrower
that it was approved by the NHA and that it had the authority to
charge points in excess of the state limit of 5%.155 The Supreme
146. See id.
147. F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233,244-245 (1972).
148. See id. at 235-36. These coupons were sold to retailers who issued them to
customers as an incentive to purchase goods from them and then exchange the
coupons for a free gift at a Sperry & Hutchinson redemption center. See id.
149. See id. at 235.
150. See id. at 245-46.
151. See id. at 248-249.
152. See id. at 249-50.
153. See id.
154. United Companies Lending Corp. v. McGehee, 686 So.2d 1171 (Ala. 1996).
155. See id. The defendants knew that their representations to the plaintiffs
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Court of Alabama held that because the out-of-state defendant
was not an approved mortgagee under the Fair Housing Act, the
mortgagee could not be exempted from the Alabama Consumer
Credit Act.156 However, the Credit Act did not regulate mortgage
lenders or brokers.,5 7 Despite this absence of applicable state
regulations, the court granted a summary judgment for the plain-
tiffs because of the fraudulent conduct by the defendant. 58 The
Alabama Supreme Court took into account both internal and ex-
ternal factors in making its determination that the lender oper-
ated in an unscrupulous manner to defraud and mislead
homeowners - particularly elderly, low income and unsophisti-
cated homeowners - who typically resided in redlined neighbor-
hoods. 5 9 To do this, the court considered that United had made
a practice of targeting homes with high equity values; many
states had deregulated usury rates; 60 the redlining of neighbor-
hoods was becoming more prevalent within the lending commu-
nity; and some states were not supervising the foreclosure
process.' 61
were false in order to deceive and induce the plaintiffs into making an illegal trans-
action. See id. at 1173. The defendants never held nor applied for a National Hous-
ing Act Mortgagee approval status for the UCLC branch office. See id. at 1174. The
plaintiff's reliance on the false statements served as the basis for the lawsuit. See id.
The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and denied the defendant's contention that UCLC was subject
to the points cap in the state regulations. See id. at 1179. The Supreme Court noted
that working people with less education are often targeted by predatory practices
in which lenders start out with loans that are small percentages of the borrower's
home equity, but later renew the loan to increase the balance and the payments
beyond the borrower's ability to repay the loan. See id. at 1176.
156. See id. at 1176.
157. The opinion of the court noted that many states, in addition to Alabama,
do not regulate the conduct of mortgage bankers or brokers. See id. at 1176-77.
158. See id. 686 So.2d at 1179.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1176. The deregulation of usury rates was in response to a lend-
ing market of high interest rates. See id.
161. See id. at 1177. See also infra note 52 (referring to the statutory history of
housing discrimination).
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V. THE NORTH CAROLINA ACT
Enacted on July 22, 1999, as a result of overwhelming
support in the North Carolina State Legislature,162 the North
Carolina Act is the first and only state statute to specifically ad-
dress the practice of predatory lending.163 This Act represents a
compromise between the consumer advocacy interests, banking
interests, and the Attorney General's office. 164 The impetus for
this statute is due largely to the leadership of Martin Eakes,
President of the Coalition for Responsible Lending (CRL).165 Un-
162. See North Carolina General Assembly (visited Nov. 11, 1999)
<http://www.ncga.state.nc.us>.
163. See Thangavelu, supra note 105. The new statute "represents the biggest
change in usury and residential mortgage lending law in North Carolina in at least
a generation." Donald Lampe, New State Predatory Lending Law: Legislative Develop-
ments in Consumer Credit, NoTES BEARING INTEREST, North Carolina Bar Association,
Jan., 2000, at 6. A similar proposal is now being considered in New York State in
the form of a banking regulation. See Heather Timmons, Home Equity: Two States'
Lawmakers Targeting Predatory Lending, AM. BANKER, Jun. 9, 1999 at 9. New York
Governor George Pataki proposed a regulation similar to that of North Carolina.
Also, the New York legislature recently proposed a bill that limits lender fees to 3%
of the loan. See Katherine Fraser, New York State Weighing Proposed Rule Designed to
Curb Predatory Lending, AM. BANKER, Aug. 16, 1999 at 1. The New York regulatory
proposal has an interest rate threshold of 9% above the Treasury bill rate and a
stringent 5% threshold for fees. See State of New York Banking Department, Proposed
Regulations (visited Oct. 26, 1999) <http://www.banking.state.ny.us/41amd.htm>.
This contrasts with the North Carolina Act which uses an interest rate threshold of
10% above the Treasury bill rate and a much less stringent financial fee threshold of
8%. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(a)(6)(b) (1999) (Effective July 1, 2000). North
Carolina's interest rate threshold follows the HOEPA threshold requirements. See
15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) (1994). However, the New York proposal does not prohibit
single premium credit insurance and it permits financing half of the finance fees.
See State of New York Banking Department, Proposed Regulations (visited Oct. 26,
1999) <http://www.banking.state.ny.us/41amd.htm>. In contrast, the North
Carolina Act totally prohibits the financing of insurance. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-
10.2(b) (1999). The North Carolina Act also prohibits the financing of fees. See id. at
§ 24-1.1E(c)(3).
164. See Amal Sabi, Bill Regulating Lenders Ends in Compromise, TRIANGLE Bus. J.,
Jul. 16,1999 at 12.
165. See Stock Telephone Interview, supra note 11. CRL is led by Martin Eakes,
President of Self-Help Credit Union, located in Durham, North Carolina. See Sabi,
supra note 14. CRL is an alliance of financial institutions, religious organizations,
community groups and others dedicated to protecting the home equity of North
Carolinians. See Schloemer Interview, supra note 8. The home equity of North
Carolinians is estimated to be approximately $100 billion. See Coalition for Responsi-
ble Lending, Questions and Answers: The North Carolina Predatory Lending Law, (visited
Nov. 8,1999) <http://www. responsiblelending.org>.
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der his guidance, advocacy groups called for stricter provisions
creating lower ceilings on interest rates and financial fees.166
In general, the North Carolina Act applies to "home
loans"1 67 secured by a first lien with a principal loan amount of
less than $300,000 for single family dwelling units.168 However,
the heart of the Act lies in the restrictions imposed on "high-cost
home loans" 69 in order to discourage their use.170 High-cost
The Coalition currently includes 73 organizations whose memberships total
over three million, as well as others who have joined as individuals: 120 CEOs of
financial institutions, and leaders from 185 housing, community development, con-
sumer and religious organizations from across the state. See id.
166. See Schloemer Interview, supra note 8. The financial sector was repre-
sented by the North Carolina Bankers Association, the North Carolina Mortgage
Bankers Association, the North Carolina Credit Union Network, the North Carolina
Association of Financial Institutions, and the North Carolina Association of Mort-
gage Bankers. See id. Regarding the legislative process, Senate Bill 1149 was spon-
sored by State Senate Majority Leader Roy Cooper. See Lehman Interview, supra
note 4. There were two major banking groups in North Carolina, the North Caro-
lina Bankers Association (representing commercial banks and savings and loans)
and The North Carolina Association of Financial Institutions, representing the five
largest banks in North Carolina. See id. The work of the banking associations, CRL,
and the Attorney General's office was a consensus effort to meet the needs of con-
sumers and the lending industry, with the understanding that most of the lending
industry was competitive and worked for most of the people. See id. A sector of
the industry was carved out in an effort to make lending more competitive and fair
so that borrowers with bad credit history and unsophisticated borrowers would
have some form of protection. See id.
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A(e) (1999). A home loan is defined as one with a
principal amount less than $300,000 that is "secured by a first mortgage or first
deed of trust on real estate upon which there is located or there is to be located one
or more single family dwellings or dwelling units." Id. This Act specifically ex-
cludes open-end credit plans. See id. Equity lines of credit are a commonly used
form of open-end credit. See Schioemer, supra note 8.
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A(e) (1999). The definition of home loans excludes
open credit plans, such as equity lines of credit. See id. at §§ 24-1.1A(a)(4), (e).
169. See id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(4)(a-e). High-cost home loans are loans in which the
borrower is a natural person, using the home for personal, family or household
purposes. See id. The principle amount of the loan does not exceed the greater of
$300,000 or the FNMA limit, and is secured by a security interest in the borrower's
principle place of residence, including manufactured housing and the loan exceeds
one of the three thresholds. See id. This definition applies to both first and second
liens, as opposed to home loans that allow first liens only. See id. To calculate the
total loan amount, the costs financed as part of the loan, including points and fees,
are subtracted from the amount financed. See id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(6)(b)(1-3). The dis-
count points or prepayment penalties paid by the borrower are also subtracted
from the amount financed. See id.
170. See Memorandum to Commissioner of Banks from L. McNeil Chestnut,
Assistant Attorney General of North Carolina, Office of Banking and Finance (Sep.
25,1999) (on file with author).
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home loans are a form of home loans in which the interest rate,
the points and fees or the prepayment penalties exceed a certain
threshold, thus triggering those restrictions. 17
This Act is broken down into eight sections.172 These sec-
tions can be classified into five themes: (1) rates and fees, (2)
threshold tests to identify high-cost mortgage loans, (3) restric-
tions on high-cost home loans, (4) prohibitions and protections,
and (5) violations of the Act.Y3
The new statute clears up ambiguities from the existing
law as to what rates and fees may be charged and collected. 174
Lenders may still charge for origination fees, commitment fees
and points without regulation as to the amount. 75 Fees for loan
171. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(a)(4)(e) (1999).
172. See id. at § 24-1.1A. The first two Sections of the Act comprise over three-
quarters of its text. Section 1 defines home loans. See id. It disallows prepayment
penalties on home loans of $150,000 or less. See id. Loan fees and modification fees
are permitted if they do not exceed the fee threshold. See id. Fees for deferring in-
terest payments cannot be charged unless they are part of the loan agreement. See
id. Section 2 defines key terms of the Act such as high-cost home loans and the
thresholds used for interest rates, points and fees, and prepayment penalties. See id.
at § 24-1.1E. Formulas for calculating points and fees and the total loan amount are
provided. See id. The restrictions, triggered by high-cost home loans, are ex-
plained. See id. Also, the consequences for violating those restrictions are listed,
along with a safe harbor provision. See id. Section 3 defines brokers and bankers as
lenders. See id. at § 24-2.5. Section 4 addresses permissible pass-through fees, in-
cluding fees going to public officials, bona fide loan related products of third par-
ties and reasonable compensation to third parties as a result of the loan transaction.
See id. at § 24-8. Section 5 provides for consumer protection from practices such as
the financing of single credit life insurance, flipping, encouraging default, and
usury. See id. at § 24-10.2. Section 5 also allows for the recovery of attorney fees for
prevailing parties. See id. Section 6 provides for the funding of public education to
encourage responsible borrowing behavior by consumers. See id. Section 7 com-
missions a legislative study to measure the affect of the North Carolina Act. See id.
Section 8 outlines the effective dates of each section of the North Carolina Act. See
id.
173. See L. McNeil Chestnut & Philip A. Lehman, Assistant Attorneys General,
North Carolina Department of Justice, Workshop Presentation for Housing Coun-
selors and Senior Service Providers, (Sep. 29,1999) (on file with authors).
174. See Donald Lampe, supra note 163.
175. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A(c), (g) (1999). However, fees may not in-
clude taxes, filing fees, recording charges and other fees and charges due to public
officials. See id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(5)(e). Also, points and fees may not include fees
paid to a person other than a lender or mortgage broker or an affiliate of either for a
variety of fees including, appraisals, inspections, credit reports, title insurance pre-
miums, and notary services. See id.
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modifications and loan deferrals are authorized but limited. 7 6
Modification fees include charges for changing the terms of a
loan and involve similar types of services as used in loan fees.17
7
Deferral fees include charges for delaying interest payments.178
To be identified as a high-cost home loan, there are several
requirements relating to loan size, borrower status, dwelling
purpose, and type of security.179 In addition, the terms of the
home loan must exceed one of three distinct thresholds relating
either to the annual percentage rate, the points and fees, or a pre-
payment penalty. 80 The annual percentage rate threshold is 10%
above the current Treasury bond security rate of comparable ma-
turity.'8' The points and fees threshold is the greater of 5% of the
total amount (if the loan is $20,000 or more) or the lesser of $1,000
or 8% of the total loan amount (for loans under $20,000).182 The
prepayment penalty threshold is the charging or collection of a
prepayment penalty or fee more than thirty months after the
close of a loan or in an amount equal to 2% of the amount pre-
paid. 183
If a loan exceeds one of the threshold tests listed above
and meets the other criteria for a high-cost home loan, numerous
restrictions are triggered.184 First, call provisions are prohibited,
meaning the payments are unilaterally accelerated so that all the
176. See id. at § 24-1.1A(cl).
177. See id. at § 24-1.1A(c2).
178. See id. at § 24-1.1A(g)(1-2).
179. See id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(4). The home loan principle must not exceed the
lesser of the FNMA single family dwelling limit or $300,000; the borrower must be a
natural person; the debt must be incurred by the borrower for primarily personal,
family or household purposes; and the loan must be secured by either a secured
interest in a manufactured home or occupied by the borrower as the principal
dwelling or a mortgage or deed of trust for real estate on which the dwelling will
stand. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(6)(a).
182. See id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(6)(b).
183. See id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(6)(c). Some discount points are excluded from the
calculation of total points and fees paid by the borrower in order to give credit for
the lowering of the interest rate. See id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(6)(b)(1-2). Also, a limited
amount of prepayment penalties can also be excluded if they are assessed early in
the life of the loan. See id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(6)(b)(3).
184. See id. at § 24-1.1E(b).
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payments immediately become due from the borrower.185 Sec-
ond, with narrow exceptions, 186 the structuring of loans so that
the final payment is at least twice the amount of a regular pay-
ment is no longer permitted. 87 These sorts of payments are
known as balloon payments. 88 Third, lenders can no longer de-
sign loans with payments so low that the consequence is a higher
loan principal,189 resulting in negative amortization.190 Fourth,
loans that require an increased interest rate in the event that the
borrower misses a payment are no longer permitted.191 Fifth, a
requirement that more than two payments be combined and paid
in advance of the loan period is not permitted.192 Sixth, fees for
modifying terms of a loan or deferring interest payments can no
longer be assessed by the lender.193
Additionally, certain practices are prohibited in the grant-
ing of high-cost home loans. 9 4 Loans cannot be made without
considering the borrower's ability to pay' 95 and without proof of
having received loan counseling to assure awareness of the ad-
visability of the loan. 96 Also, lenders may not include the cost of
any fees, penalties, points, or third party charges in the amount
of the loan.197 This enables the borrower to avoid stripping the
185. See id. at § 24-1.1E(b)(1).
186. See id. at § 24-1.1A(a)(4). Sections One and Two of the North Carolina Act
create exceptions that allow balloon payments in the following three scenarios. See
id. With respect to first mortgages, state licensed lenders may not use balloon pay-
ments any longer than six months into a loan. See id. at § 24-1.1A(a)(4). Second, the
prohibition of balloon payments does not apply to equity lines of credit. See id.
Third, under mortgage loans in general, the prohibition does not apply to payment
schedules that are adjusted to the irregular or seasonal income of the borrower. See
id. at § 24-1.1E(b)(2).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id. at § 24-1.1E(b)(3).
190. See id.
191. See id. at § 24-1.1E(b)(4).
192. See id. at § 24-1.1E(b)(5).
193. See id. at § 24-1.1E2(b)(6).
194. See id. at § 24-1.1E(c).
195. See id. at § 24-1.1E(c)(2). The borrower's ability to pay is based on income,
obligations, employment status and other financial sources. See id.
196. See id. at § 24-1.1E(c)(1).
197. See id. at § 24-1.1E(c)(3).
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value of the equity in his home. That is, the borrower's equity
cannot be used to finance those fees.198 Fourth, a lender cannot
charge for points or fees when refinancing the loan of a current
borrower.199 Finally, payments to home improvement contrac-
tors must come directly from the borrower or an escrow agent.200
Aside from the above prohibitions, the North Carolina Act
creates three consumer home loan protections that apply to all
loans without regard to the amount of the loan or whether it is
secured by a first or second lien.201 To be eligible for the protec-
tion, the dwelling must be occupied by the borrower as the bor-
rower's principal dwelling.2 2 These protections outlaw the
flipping of loans;203 unfair practices of financing single premium
credit insurance as opposed to making separate premium pay-
ments on a monthly basis;2°4 and encouraging loan defaults as a
means to refinance debt.20 5 Consumer home loans that violate
any provision of these consumer protections are subject to usury
and unfair trade practice remedies under North Carolina law.
20 6
Also, attorneys' fees may be awarded in appropriate cases.207
It is not unlawful to grant high-cost home loans.20 8 How-
198. See Telephone Interview with Philip A. Lehman, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of North Carolina, Office of Consumer Protection (Nov. 5, 1999) [hereinafter
Lehman Telephone Interview of Nov. 5,1999].
199. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(c)(4) (1999).
200. See id. at § 24-1.1E(c)(5).
201. See id. at § 24-10.2(a).
202. See id. The home must be designed for the occupancy of one to four fami-
lies and used as the borrower's principal dwelling. See id. The home must also be
used for personal, family or household purposes and the borrower must be a natu-
ral person with a secured loan. See id.
203. See id. at § 24-10.2(c). This part of the statute represents the broadest and
most immediate affect on residential mortgage loan refinancing transactions. See
Donald Lampe, supra note 163.
204. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(b) (1999) (Effective July 1, 2000).
205. See id. at § 24-10.2(d).
206. See id. at § 24-10.2(e).
207. See id. at § 24-8(d). Attorneys' fees are identified as a loan-related good,
product, or service. See id. Lenders may collect charges for bona fide loan-related
goods, products, and services from third parties, such as attorneys. See id. How-
ever, any unreasonable compensation or compensation from non loan-related or
nominal goods, products or services may not be charged by third parties. See id.
208. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(d) (1999). High-cost home loans are not pro-
hibited anywhere in the North Carolina Act. See id. However, restrictions and limi-
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ever, if the restrictions are violated, the lender will be declared
guilty of usury and an unfair business practice.2 9 The Attorney
General, the Commissioner of Banks, or any party to a high-cost
home loan may bring an enforcement action.210 Lenders are also
prohibited from structuring their loans as open-end credit or
multiple loans in order to escape the provisions of the North
Carolina Act.21' Violations of the high-cost home loan section of
the North Carolina Act are subject to either usury penalties or
Chapter 75 penalties.212 "Lenders who violate the Act uninten-
tionally or through bona fide error will be given an opportunity
to bring the loan into compliance with the law."213
The high-cost home loan provision and the prohibition on
the financing of single premium credit insurance take effect on
July 1, 2000.214 The remaining portions of the North Carolina Act
took effect on October 1, 1999.215
A. Application of the North Carolina Act
The examples of predatory lending practices discussed in
the introduction section could have been prevented or resolved
by a statute containing the provisions of the North Carolina
Act.216 One of these examples featured a partially disabled single
male without any family who had a $36,000 home equity loan at
an interest rate of 16.5%.217 This loan was refinanced within just
four months and it included a $75,000 life insurance provision of
which the borrower had no knowledge nor any family member
tations are applied when the terms of high-cost loans exceed any one of the North
Carolina Act's three thresholds. See id.
209. See id. at § 24-1.1E(d).
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id. Usury penalties include the forfeiture of interest and the return of
twice the amount of interest paid. See L. McNeil Chestnut & Philip A. Lehman,
Assistant Attorneys General, N.C. Dep't. of Justice, Workshop Presentation for
Housing Counselors and Senior Service Providers, at 4 (Sep. 29, 1999) (on file with
authors). Chapter 75 penalties include treble damages. See id.
213. Id. at 4.
214. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2 (1999).
215. See id.
216. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 11.
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to act as beneficiaries of such coverage.218
Based on the North Carolina Act, if the comparable Treas-
ury bill rate at the time of the loan had been less than 6.5%, the
high-cost home loan provisions would have been triggered. If
the finance fees had exceeded 5% of $36,000 ($1,800), these same
provisions would also have been triggered.219
Under these provisions, the lender would have been held
liable for violating several restrictions pertaining specifically to
high-cost home loans.220 Such violations would include the ab-
sence of homeowner counseling, no consideration of the bor-
rower's inability to repay the loan, the financing of points or fees,
and the charging of a finance fee for refinancing an existing
loan.221 Also, effective July 1, 2000, the lender could be held li-
able for financing the life insurance policy.222 Aside from being a
high-cost loan, the lender violated the consumer protection pro-
hibitions of flipping and encouraging default as well.
B. Concerned Voices
Lender and broker groups have raised several areas of con-
cern to the North Carolina Department of Justice in regard to the
North Carolina Act.224 These concerns include flipping, discount
points, the 5% fee threshold, and prepayment penalties.225
In regard to the flipping of loans, lenders desire a bright
line test of what constitutes flipping.226 For example, some lend-
218. See id.
219. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(a)(6) (1999). The calculation of these fees
would exclude taxes and filing fees paid to public officials, as well as fees paid to
persons other than the lender or affiliate. See id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(5)(e).
220. See id. at § 24-1.1E(c).
221. See id. (including several violations of the high-cost home loan limitations).
222. See id. at § 24-10.2(b).
223. See. id. at § 24-10.2(c), (d).
224. See Lehman Telephone Interview of Nov. 5,1999, supra note 198.
225. See id.
226. See id. The new statutory definition for flipping is as follows:
Flipping.. .is the making of a consumer home loan to a borrower
which refinances an existing consumer home loan when the new
loan does not have reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower
considering all of the circumstances, including the terms of both the
2000] 599
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
ers expect that borrowers will use the accusation of flipping as a
defense against a foreclosure action on any loan that has been re-
financed in hopes of avoiding the foreclosure.227 But borrowers
will have difficulty in establishing both that there was unfairness
and that the refinancing arrangement was of no benefit to
them.2
Discount points represent another problem area for first
mortgage lenders.229 If these points are paid upfront in return for
lower interest rates, then they are permitted. 230 However, some
lenders are concerned because they may have difficulty proving
that a borrower derived a benefit from a discount fee charged by
a broker, who is outside the lender's immediate purview.231 For
instance, a broker may tell a borrower that the lender's rate is 9%
and that he is willing to come down to 8% in return for the bor-
rower paying discount points, despite the fact that the lender's
rate was already 8%.232 Under this scenario, without enjoying
any benefit, the lender takes on the liability for the broker's ac-
tions. For this reason, some lenders believe that brokers should
not be permitted to charge a discount point since the broker is
not the one extending the loan. M
Some brokers expressed concern about the 5% fee thresh-
old.2m Brokers are worried that this may not give them the sort
of profit to which they have been accustomed in the past.235
These added fees may not have any relationship to services ren-
new and refinanced loans, the cost of the new loan, and the bor-
rower's circumstances.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(c) (1999).






233. See id. Aside from discount points, some brokers are compensated by a
method known as yield-spread premiums in which the broker receives a fee from
the lender for making a loan at a higher interest rate than required by the lender.
See id.
234. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(a)(6)(b) (1999). The threshold for points and
fees is 5% for home loans equal to or greater than $20,000. See id.
235. See Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. §
1602(aa)(1994). The HOEPA fee threshold trigger is 8%. See id.
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dered. Merely using labels to justify additional expenses is not
permitted under the North Carolina Act.236 To make loans more
attractive, some brokers will break down their fees so that the
terms will appear competitive.237 They may move origination
costs to other labels, knowing that when the borrower compares
the rates of other brokers, the borrower will most likely only
compare the stated interest rate and the origination fee, even
though there may be other fees under the loan.238 Legitimate
third party fees coming from surveys, appraisal fees, or attorneys
fees are permissible.239
Over the last two years, common consumer complaints re-
ceived by the North Carolina Department of Justice have in-
cluded the use of high fees, flipping, packing, bait and switch,
and prepayment penalties. 240
Of the complaints reviewed by the North Carolina De-
partment of Justice, some loans carried annual percentage rates
in excess of 10% and fees up to 10%, excluding bona fide third
party fees.241 In regard to flipping, much of this practice is due to
the aggressive marketing practices that influence consumers to
refinance their loans with added fees.242 Additionally, some
lenders engage in the practice of packing, in which charges are
assessed for credit insurance which are not affirmatively re-
236. See Lehman Telephone Interview of Nov. 5, 1999, supra note 198. Addi-
tional fees and charges for loans or modifying loans, no matter what they are called,
cannot exceed the greater of $150 or .25% of the balance of the loan at the time of
the transaction. See Prohibit Predatory Lending, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-
1.1A(c)(1)(f)(1999). If an additional fee or charge pertains to a loan modification,
there must be a written, signed, and contemporaneous agreement that states the
amount of the fee or charge at the time of the specific modification. See id. at § 24-
1.1A(c)(2), (e). Modifications include renewals, extensions and amendments of loan
terms. See id.
237. See Lehman Telephone Interview of Nov. 5,1999, supra note 198.
238. See id.
239. See Prohibit Predatory Lending, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A(c)(1),(2) (1999).
Payments for bona fide loan-related goods, products, and services from third par-
ties and payments for taxes, filing fees, and recording fees going to public officials
are permitted. See id.
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quested by the borrower.243 When this happens, it puts borrow-
ers at a significant disadvantage because the equity in their
homes is used to finance the high premiums for life insurance. 244
This practice is known as equity stripping.245
The Office of the Commissioner of Banks handles the vast
majority of predatory lending complaints.246 Over the past three
years, the number of written complaints concerning predatory
lending practices has risen drastically.247 The most frequent
complaint is bait and switch by brokers, in which predatory bro-
kers quote a low rate for borrowers with credit problems.248
Then the loan closing is delayed until the borrowers are desper-
ate, at which time the broker reveals the true interest rates and
fees.249
243. See id. During the process of investigating a complaint, the Department of
Justice may discover that packing has occurred without the borrower knowing it.
See id.
244. See id.
245. See id. For example, one loan of $28,000 was investigated that included a
total insurance premium of $4,000. See id. Another loan of $76,000 included a total
insurance premium of $11,000. See id.
246. See Lehman Telephone Interview of Nov. 5,1999, supra note 198.
247. See Telephone Interview with George King, Ombudsman, Office of the
Commissioner of Banking, (Nov. 5, 1999) [hereinafter King Telephone Interview].
In 1996, there were approximately 150 such complaints, but in 1997, the number
rose to about 300. See id. The 1998 figure was approximately 600, and the 1999 vol-
ume is likely rise to over 700 written complaints. See id.
248. See id. These consumers had credit ratings of "B" and "C," based on the
borrower credit categories. See id.
249. See id. Aside from high interest rates, discount fees (used to buy down the
interest rate, thus lowering the amount of monthly payments) and origination fees
(used to cover the incidental costs of processing a loan), some predatory mortgage
brokers charge for other fees and list them separately as loan review, document
preparation, loan underwriting, appraisal review, and processing fees for which no
services are rendered. See id. These other fees are called junk fees because they
attach to the loan without services rendered. See id. Another popular complaint
category involves the use of yield-spread premiums. See id. Mortgage lenders and
brokers sometimes agree to split the difference in profit when the broker is able to
sell a loan in excess of the interest rate the lender normally demands. See id. Bal-
loon payments occur frequently because it is so easy to hide this loan feature in the
paperwork; there are commonly between 25 to 40 documents that must be signed
by the borrower at a loan-closing meeting. See id. Since the interest rates have be-
gun to rise in recent months, some predatory mortgage lenders and brokers have
closed their operations, due to decreased consumer demand for loans. See id.
However, the barriers to entering the loan broker business are very low. See id. It
costs just $500 to apply for a state registration issued by the Office of the Commis-
sioner of Banks. See id. The yearly registration fee is $250. See id. The only other
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Some members of the banking community do not expect
much effect, if any, on the conventional lending market from the
enforcement of the North Carolina Act,250 while others fear an-
ticipated consequences. 251
Even though the North Carolina Act will restrain some
predatory practices, the Coalition for Responsible Lending con-
tends that predatory lending will not be eliminated unless
stronger broker licensing requirements are enacted into law.25 2
The need for such action has arisen because brokers are feebly
regulated, thus making it difficult to track those brokers who are
guilty of improper conduct.2 3 Aimed at requiring more respon-
sible broker practices, Senate Bill 866 was introduced in Spring
1999 but was deferred until the 2000 session.254 Perhaps the most
requirements are a $25,000 surety bond and an unaudited financial statement that
indicates a positive net worth. See id. Unfortunately, by the time the Banking
Commission receives complaints, the broker usually cannot be found to investigate
those complaints, due to the sudden relocation of its operations. See id. If a com-
plaint is received on a registrant, an administrative hearing is conducted, giving the
broker the opportunity to show cause why its registration should not be revoked.
See id. Following this process, the Department of Justice can evaluate the case for
possible prosecution. See id. Criminal prosecution or civil action may be taken
against violators. See id.
250. See Telephone Interview with Ed Aycock, Senior Vice President and Regu-
latory Counsel, North Carolina Bankers Association (Nov. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Ay-
cock Telephone Interview]. Most observers within the North Carolina Bankers
Association contend that the non-regulatory lenders are the main culprits for
predatory lending. See id. Mr. Aycock stated that "the litany of horror stories are
not coming from the savings and loan institutions or bank, which are highly regu-
lated." Id. The North Carolina Bankers Association and the North Carolina Asso-
ciation of Financial Institutions, representing the largest banks in North Carolina,
merged in October of 1999 under the name of the former. See id. The purpose of
the North Carolina Act was to address the non-legitimate lenders who are not part
of the competitive lending market. See id. Because of this, Mr. Aycock stated that
"members of depository institutions are not anticipating any adverse result from
the legislation." Id.
251. See electronic mail letter from William Finley, Vice-President and Assistant
General Counsel for First Union Corporation (Jan. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Finley Let-
ter]. William Finley indicated that some North Carolina banks did express concerns
that Senate Bill 1149, the predatory lending statutory proposal, could produce unin-
tended systems and financial impacts, though their severity is as yet undetermined.
See id.
252. See Lupton Interview, supra note 17.
253. See id.
254. See Predatory Lending and Proposed Broker Licensing Legislation: Work-
shop on Consumer Fraud Scams Targeting Seniors, 1999 State Conference on Aging
(Nov. 3, 1999) (on file with the Coalition for Responsible Lending). North Carolina
Senate Bill 866 was referred to the Commerce Committee on April 13, 1999. See
2000]
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impressive outcome of the Act was the collaborative process
demonstrated by consumer advocacy groups, the financial com-
munity, and the State Department of Justice.25
VI. CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Act represents a critical step in en-
couraging more responsible lending practices and it addresses
several gaps in the federal law. However, North Carolina is still
hampered with numerous federal laws that unintentionally en-
courage risky lending and serve as a destructive force in commu-
nities, as seen in the use of redlining and reverse redlining.
25 6
Because of this, HMDA must be enforced vigorously so that
predatory lending practices can be statistically monitored with
some precision to determine how best to address unchecked
predatory practices which evolve in the future.
In regard to future state legislation, a cooperative effort
between industry, regulators, and consumer advocates should be
focused on creating across-the-board prohibitions on deceptive
lending practices, as predatory lenders find ways to side-step the
new laws. On the immediate horizon, the triggering thresholds
for high-rate rates and fees should be calibrated using some logi-
cal rationale, and mortgage brokers should be licensed in order to
promote more responsible lending in their ranks.
A more efficient and reasonable balance between competi-
tive loan fees and lender incentives should be used in the interest
of homeowner stability. This can be accomplished by adding the
average percentage cost for servicing a subprime loan to the con-
ventional rate instead of using the current 5% threshold.257 A
similar methodology could be used for determining the interest
rate threshold as well.
Even more important than rate and fee thresholds, abu-
sive lending practices tie the hands of borrowers and contribute
to the likelihood of devastation for many borrowers and their
N.C. Senate Bill 866 (1999-2000 Session). No further action has been taken. See id.
255. See Lehman Interview, supra note 4.
256. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 16.
257. See DeZube, supra note 26.
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families.2 8 Because of this, the wide latitude currently enjoyed
by mortgage brokers must be bridled by establishing a code of
fiduciary responsibilities for them. Senate Bill 866-Committee
Substitute provides for the licensure of certain mortgage lenders
and brokers; it clarifies the duties of a mortgage broker to the cli-
ent; and it prohibits yield-spread premiums in which the broker
gets a fee for making a loan with a higher interest rate.2 59 The bill
also provides for enforcement mechanisms, including the use of
civil penalties against mortgage lenders and brokers without li-
censes.260
As a final note, the Legislative Research Commission is
expected to evaluate the alleged benefits of financing single-
premium credit life insurance, as required.261 This insurance
product is frequently sold to borrowers who think that loan ap-
proval is contingent upon their acceptance of the insurance. 262
The added premiums deplete a borrower's equity and therefore
increase the amount of principal to be financed.263 Instead, in-
surance products should be sold separately on a monthly basis so
that homeowners can control the duration of the coverage, and so
that there is no confusion over whether the insurance is a contin-
gency for credit approval. 264 Unfortunately, the North Carolina
Act provides a window in which the provisions relating to the
prohibition on the sale of financed insurance products could be
258. See Lupton Interview, supra note 17.
259. See N.C. Senate Bill 866 (1999-2000 Session) (visited March 4, 2000)
<http://www.ncga.state. nc.us/htm11999/bills/senate/sbi10866.full.html>.
260. See id. Specifically, the broker would have to make a reasonable effort to
put the borrower into a favorable loan; disclose information about the best loan
terms offered by the lender; and also disclose broker fees charged to the borrower
and fees paid by the lender to the broker. See id. In addition, the broker's commis-
sion should be included in the overall loan fee in order to trigger predatory restric-
tions at lower levels. See id. This provision would also make it more difficult for a
broker to hide his commission. See id.
261. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(g) (1999). Under the North Carolina Act, a
lender will be prohibited from directly or indirectly financing any credit life, dis-
ability, or unemployment insurance, or any other life or health insurance premiums
in connection with a consumer home loan. See id. at § 24-10.2(b).
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altered. Such an action would lead to increased hardship for
many unsophisticated borrowers and therefore must be pre-
vented.
RICHARD R. DAUGHERTY
